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The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) claiming the non-self-governing territory of 
Western Sahara is of such a unique nature as a contested state that it appears stronger in terms of 
constitutive statehood than of declaratory statehood. The reason for that is that it does not 
possesses substantial control over most of the land it claims, which has long been occupied and 
annexed by Morocco, and it operates instead on a largely extraterritorial basis from the Sahrawi 
refugee camps on Algerian soil. In practice, the SADR functions as a hybrid between a state-in-
exile and a de facto state, drawing international recognition from multiple overlapping sources. 
 
This chapter provides a comparative insight into the particular features of Western Sahara/SADR 
as an outlier within the universe of contested states, and the small print of international recognition 
and statehood stemming from them. Following a historical background on Western Sahara’s 
historical struggle for statehood, the conceptual debate will be addressed as to why the SADR 
escapes all of the usual categories, while sharing some features with de facto/quasi/unrecognised 
states on one hand and states-in-exile on the other. This will lead to consideration of the mixed 
effect that the combination of foreign occupation and extraterritoriality has on the SADR’s 
statehood under international law. Next, the multiple territorialities of Western Sahara/SADR will 
be unpacked by discussing the effective situation of the Moroccan-annexed Western Sahara 
territory, the Algerian-based Sahrawi refugee camps where the Polisario Front and the SADR 
have their extraterritorial headquarters and primary area of governance, and the so-called 
Liberated Zone that the last two actors control in Western Sahara proper. Finally, these 
territorialities will be connected to three partially overlapping sources of international 
(non)recognition, i.e. the non-recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty claims over Western Sahara, 
the recognition of the Polisario Front as a national liberation movement and a conflict party, and 
the partial recognition of the SADR as a sovereign state. 
 
2. Western Sahara’s historical struggle for statehood 
 
Western Sahara is a former Spanish colony in North Africa. Lying on Africa’s Atlantic coast, 
Western Sahara is bordered by Morocco to the north, Mauritania to the south and east, and Algeria 
to the northeast. It is comparable in size to the United Kingdom, or to the US state of Colorado. 
Much of the territory is characterised by low, rocky desert, with a few small mountains and oases. 
Historically, the territory’s inhabitants have been Hassaniyya-speaking nomadic pastoralists who 
have come to be called Sahrawis; they are an Arab-Berber ethnic group. There is no precise 
territorial correspondence between the areas inhabited by ethnic Sahrawis and the political 
Western Sahara defined along colonial borders (Zunes and Mundy 2010: 92-93). Rather, people 
who broadly fit the ethnic definition of Sahrawi have historically lived in southern Morocco, 
Algeria, Mauritania and Mali as well as in Western Sahara. Nevertheless, the overwhelming 
majority of Western Sahara’s pre-colonial inhabitants were Sahrawis, and Western Sahara exists 
at the centre of the traditional Sahrawi range. From 1884 to 1975, Western Sahara was a Spanish 
colony, existing for the first time as a fixed territorial unit with delineated borders. The Spaniards, 
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lacking the resources of adjacent colonial regimes such as France, mainly limited their control to 
coastal cities and enclaves, and for the most part allowed the desert interior to exist on its own. 
Although there were occasional clashes between the Spanish and Sahrawi nomadic groups, there 
were also instances of cooperation; Sahrawis served in the Spanish military, worked in cities, and 
sometimes participated in local politics (Hodges 1983).   
 
By the 1960-1970s, amid a global drive towards decolonisation, Spain came under increasing 
pressure to relinquish its colonial hold on what was then known as Spanish Sahara, which was 
listed by the UN as a non-self-governing territory. Although the territory had a notional right to 
self-determination, Morocco aggressively pursued its own claim as part of a larger irredentist 
narrative invoking a historical ‘Greater Morocco’ which included parts of Algeria and Mauritania 
as well. Partly in response to Moroccan irredentism, Mauritania subsequently made its own claim 
on the territory. However, a fact-finding mission by the UN concluded that there was 
‘overwhelming support’ among the population for independence under the leadership of the 
Polisario Front (Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro), a Sahrawi 
nationalist movement founded in 1973. These three conflicting claims – Moroccan, Mauritanian, 
and Polisario – were brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In a 1975 advisory 
opinion, the ICJ concluded that, while there existed ‘legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan 
of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara’, these ‘[did] not 
establish any tie of territorial sovereignty’ which would overrule ‘the principle of self-
determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory’ 
(International Court of Justice 1975) – a decision that Morocco contested launching the so-called 
Green March over the territory (Wilson 2016: 18-19).  
 
Notwithstanding the ICJ opinion, Spain unilaterally withdrew from the territory later in 1975, 
partitioning it between Morocco and Mauritania. The Polisario Front immediately began a two-
front guerrilla war, hoping to secure the territory for an independent Sahrawi state. Initially, 
Polisario’s performance in the war was impressive for an outnumbered, outgunned guerrilla 
movement. Sahrawi knowledge of the deep desert and reliance on traditional hit-and-run tactics 
resulted in some spectacular raids deep into Mauritania or in southern Morocco. By 1979, unable 
to sustain the cost of a deeply unpopular war, Mauritania withdrew and made its peace with 
Polisario. Morocco, initially focused on retaining control of a series of coastal enclaves and a 
phosphate mine at Bou Craa, pivoted towards a novel counterinsurgency strategy. Starting with 
its relatively small area, Morocco constructed a defensive wall, or ‘berm’, which it gradually 
expanded outwards in concentric circles. While the berm did not entirely prevent Polisario raids, 
it did slow them down, as Sahrawi fighters had to take time to clear minefields or find ways 
around barriers, and gave Morocco more time to respond. By the mid-1980s, the wall had been 
pushed deep into the interior, and the war was at a stalemate (Hodges 1983). With the permission 
of the Algerian government, Polisario had set up a series of refugee camps just across the border 
in the Algerian province of Tindouf in 1976. Tens of thousands of Sahrawis migrated to these 
camps with the outbreak and the continuation of the war. 
 
In 1991, with neither side able to make significant military progress, a ceasefire was brokered by 
the UN along with a Settlement Plan that provided for a self-determination referendum for the 
indigenous Sahrawi people, which was accepted by both parties – though with no prior agreement 
on the electorate entitled to vote. Not coincidentally, Morocco had been promoting since 1976 the 
settlement in the area of Western Sahara under its control of 200,000-300,000 Moroccan citizens, 
a significant part of which were actually ethnic Sahrawis from southern Morocco. This settlement 
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policy’s original aim of ‘Moroccanising’ Western Sahara and creating demographic facts on the 
ground gained additional strategic value on the eve of the voter identification process conducted 
by the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). In an attempt to secure 
a favourable electorate, Morocco sponsored over 100,000 applicants who claimed to be natives 
of Western Sahara but were eventually rejected by MINURSO (Jensen 2012: 89-90). The flood 
of new claimants made the referendum significantly more complicated; within a few years, it had 
effectively been abandoned, while Moroccan formal annexation and infrastructure development 
entrenched its occupation of the western three quarters of the territory. 
 
Since that time, Morocco has continued to administer most of the territory of the former Spanish 
Sahara. The Polisario Front, having established the SADR as a state-in-exile, continued to control 
the easternmost part of their claimed territory in addition to the refugee camps around Tindouf in 
Algeria. The 1991 ceasefire between the two sides has largely held, turning Western Sahara into 
a frozen conflict (Chávez Fregoso and Živković 2012) where ‘the violence stopped, but the 
underlying interests of the formerly warring parties have neither been abated nor addressed’ 
(Perry 2009: 36; see Smetana and Ludvík 2018) . Under Moroccan occupation, many Sahrawis 
experience violent repression and economic discrimination (Porges and Leuprecht 2016). 
Humanitarian conditions in the refugee camps are also challenging. Although a series of Sahrawi 
protest movements in the Moroccan-occupied territory have emboldened nonviolent Sahrawi 
resistance (Fernández-Molina 2015), the conflict appears entrenched, with little prospect of 
significant movement in the near future short of a return to war.  
 
3. A hybrid of a state-in-exile and a de facto state 
 
As a result of this background, the SADR shares important common features with what Scott 
Pegg calls ‘de facto states’ (1998), as well as with Pål Kolstø’s ‘quasi-states’ (2006; see also 
Jackson 1993) and Nina Caspersen’s ‘unrecognised states’ (2012) – territories/entities that have 
‘achieved de facto independence’ and whose ‘leadership is seeking to build further state 
institutions and demonstrate its own legitimacy’ while lacking full international recognition as 
independent states (see also Caspersen and Stansfield 2011: 1-2). The SADR meets Pegg’s 
definitional criteria of having an organised political leadership backed by popular support, the 
capacity to provide governance and governmental services to a certain population, the self-
assigned capacity to enter into relations with other states and the aim to achieve widespread 
international recognition of its sovereignty (Pegg 1998: 26). However, contrary to most of the 
strange political creatures that are usually grouped in these three overlapping categories, the 
SADR does not possesses substantial control over the territory it claims (Kolstø 2006: 725-726; 
Caspersen 2012: 8), three quarters of which have been de facto controlled and annexed by 
Morocco since 1976/1979. The second key difference is that the SADR has not been ‘unable to 
achieve any degree of substantive recognition’ from the international society (Pegg 1998: 26), for 
it has been recognised since its foundation by 84-85 UN member states and it currently maintains 
diplomatic relations with around 40 of these. 
 
Western Sahara/SADR fits better but still strikes as being an atypical case within the wider 
conceptual universe of ‘contested states’ – a looser terms that leave the polities’ territoriality aside 
and focuses instead on the ‘internationally contested nature of their purported statehood’ 
(Geldenhuys 2009: 3). This is because in this instance, and only somewhat like in Palestine, 
statehood contestation does not stem from secessionism but from occupation by a historically and 
legally separate neighbouring state in the context of deviant or thwarted decolonisation process. 
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Furthermore, the Moroccan occupation and annexation of most the Western Sahara territory has 
led the SADR to operate as a primarily extraterritorial state-in-exile (Wilson 2016: 10; see also 
McConnell 2016) from its operational base in the Tindouf refugee camps in south-western 
Algeria. The combination of foreign occupation and extraterritoriality has a mixed effect on the 
SADR’s statehood under international law. On one hand, foreign occupation has reinforced it 
from the perspective of the constitutive theory of statehood, which emphasises criteria of 
legitimacy and external collective endorsement, i.e. recognition by other states – if only as a 
reaction against the perceived illegitimacy of Moroccan sovereignty claims. On the other hand, 
extraterritoriality undermines the SADR’s statehood in terms of the declaratory theory prevailing 
in modern legal doctrine, which prioritises purely functional/effectiveness features such as the 
1933 Montevideo Convention criteria (Oeter 2015; see Crawford 2006), and therefore the 
SADR’s actual ability to govern the Moroccan-annexed territory. This being said, the SADR’s 
extraterritoriality is not absolute due to its control over the easternmost 25% of Western Sahara 
proper – which Sahrawi nationalists refer to as their Liberated Zone, aware of its importance in 
terms of declaratory statehood. Also, in terms of population, the SADR institutionally reaches out 
to Sahrawis living under Moroccan control, as well as further afield, through its Ministry of the 
Occupied Territories and the Saharawi Community Abroad. This form of recognition is not just 
symbolic, even more so in the case of the Polisario Front, whose Popular General Congress grants 
all those Sahrawis political participation rights on an equal footing with their refugee counterparts, 
and includes a Commission of the Occupied Territories and the Intifada of Independence 
(Fernández-Molina 2019: 17-18). 
 
Admittedly, the conceptual and comparative debate remains largely academic, for in the policy 
domain, labels such as de facto, quasi, unrecognised, contested state and so on are rarely applied 
to Western Sahara/SADR, which tends to go unclassified. For one, UN documents do not usually 
mention the state-like SADR as such, and avoid any description or labelling of Western Sahara 
beyond ‘non-self-governing territory’. UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions 
refer to the latter as simply ‘Western Sahara’ adding, especially since 2006-2007, a very 
diplomatic mix of ‘self-determination’ and ‘political solution’ language with the aim of pleasing 
both parties. For example, all of the recent UN General Assembly resolutions on the ‘question of 
Western Sahara’, such as the one passed in December 2018, identically refer in their preamble to 
the ‘inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence’ while ‘recognising 
that all available options for self-determination of the Territories are valid as long as they are in 
accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned (…)’. Based on this, they 
express support for the UN-led negotiation process negotiations ‘with a view to achieving a just, 
lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination 
of the people of Western Sahara (…)’ (UN General Assembly 2018: preamble and paragraph 2). 
This last phrase is literally taken from Security Council resolutions (see e.g. UN Security Council 
2018). In the case of the more detailed reports of the UN Secretary-General, the territorial object 
of the dispute is called ‘Western Sahara’ or simply ‘the Territory’. More specific references to the 
different sites or territorialities of the conflict are made by distinguishing between ‘east of the 
berm’ (Polisario-controlled zone) and ‘west of the berm’ (Moroccan-annexed territory), or 
employing neutral geographical terms such as Laayoune (capital of the Moroccan-annexed 
territory), Tindouf (site of the Sahrawi refugee camps) or Rabouni (camp where most of the 
SADR administration is located) (UN Secretary-General 2018). When it comes to the European 
Union (EU), the dispute over Western Sahara has been sometimes categorised as one of the 
‘protracted conflicts’ that pose a security challenge in the European neighbourhood – along with 
those in Israel-Palestine, the South Caucasus and Moldova/ Transnistria (European 
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Commission/High Representative 2011: 5). As will be discussed below, the most interesting 
common point in international policy discourse on this conflict is that the description of the 
Moroccan presence in Western Sahara as ‘occupation’ has virtually become taboo for Western 
actors and the UN. 
 
4. Territorialities of Western Sahara 
 
In other words, the multiple territorialities of Western Sahara need to be discussed in plural and 
as an essential requirement for understanding the subtleties of the recognition of the SADR as a 
state. 
 
Western Sahara under Moroccan occupation 
 
While the former Spanish Sahara is classified by the UN as a non-self-governing territory and 
therefore officially subject to a decolonisation mandate (San Martín 2010: 5), about three-quarters 
of the territory are currently under Moroccan control, formally annexed and administered as part 
of the kingdom’s ‘Southern Provinces’. No country officially recognises Morocco’s claim to 
Western Sahara. As a result, there is a limited international presence in Moroccan-annexed 
Western Sahara other than the MINURSO, an UN peacekeeping mission which originally exists 
to carry out the self-determination referendum but is now mainly tasked with monitoring the 
ceasefire on both sides of the berm. MINURSO, notably, is the only UN peacekeeping mission 
without a human rights monitoring mandate – attempts to include such a mandate from 2009 to 
2013 were thwarted by Moroccan diplomacy and its supporters at the UN Security Council 
(Fernández-Molina 2016: 68-72). On the other hand, the Moroccan de facto control is reinforced 
and implicitly legitimated through international economic cooperation with Morocco over 
Western Saharan resources (fish, phosphates, etc.), including the series of such agreements 
between Morocco and the EU. The ongoing (at the time of writing) conflict between the European 
Commission, which has repeatedly shown a willingness to sign agreements with Morocco that 
include resources originating in Western Sahara, and the European Court of Justice, which has 
ruled that such agreements are illegal, is a point of intersection between de facto and de jure 
international politics (Porges 2018).  
 
It is difficult to know how many Sahrawis indigenous to Western Sahara live in the Moroccan-
occupied territory today. The total number of inhabitants is somewhere over half a million, with 
Moroccan settlers representing a majority – there have been few, if any, empirical surveys of the 
population in recent years, due largely to Morocco’s strict control of research carried out there. 
Rhetorically and legally, the Polisario Front/SADR has a claim on Western Sahara, both as its 
legitimate authority in the eyes of the UN and because Sahrawi nationalism is constructed around 
this territory. Diplomatically, messaging has tended to focus on the illegality of what they term 
‘occupation’, and of trade agreements concluded with Morocco over resources originating in 
Western Sahara. A Polisario press release issued in response to the UN Security Council’s 
extension of the MINURSO mandate in October 2018, stated, in part,  
 
The Non-Self-Governing Territory of Western Sahara has been illegally occupied by 
Morocco since 31 October 1975 (…). It is critical that the Security Council uphold 
unequivocally the legal status of the Territory and preserve its territorial integrity (…). 
The Frente POLISARIO – whose raison d’être is to uphold the inalienable and sacrosanct 
rights and national aspirations of the Sahrawi people – will accept nothing less than the 
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full respect for the inalienable right of our People to self-determination and independence 
(SPS 2011).  
 
All available evidence suggests that there is considerable support for Sahrawi statehood among 
Sahrawis living under occupation – though it is, once again, difficult to know how many (Porges 
and Leuprecht 2016). Polisario/SADR’s claim on Western Sahara has a discursive role even 
though the possibility of a Sahrawi state there in the short term is remote. This claim, and its legal 
backing, provides political legitimacy in the camps. Discursively, it has a complex relationship to 
Sahrawis living under occupation; the relationship between Polisario/SADR and Sahrawi 
resistance in the occupied territory certainly requires further research, but researchers should be 
careful not to uncritically elide these categories. 
 
SADR in Algeria 
 
Separately from the territory of Western Sahara, Polisario/SADR administers five refugee camps, 
an administrative town, and the desert around them in the Algerian province of Tindouf with the 
permission of the Algerian state authorities. Although Polisario exercises some sort of de facto 
sovereignty by delegation in the area immediately surrounding the camps, some security 
responsibilities are shared with Algeria. The population here is probably around 120,000 – the 
camp administration is reluctant to allow census-taking inside the camps. Figures run from 90,000 
to 173,000; Oxfam has estimated 120,000 as a low-end figure between all camps (Porges’ 
interview with Oxfam representative, Rabouni, 2016). Some population estimates use resource 
distribution in the camps such as food, fuel, and some other resources provided by the World 
Food Program (WFP), Oxfam, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the 
Algerian government; while UNHCR bases its estimates on satellite imagery. Because some 
percentage of the population retains nomadic ties outside of the camps for part of the year, any 
particular population estimate is likely to be a snapshot rather than a definitive count (Porges’ 
fieldwork notes, Tindouf, 2016; Wilson 2017: 84-85).  
 
Sahrawi refugees in the camps may travel freely in Algeria, and Algerians may visit the camps 
with permission from the government. In some years, when areas around the camps are fertile, 
Algerian nomads may graze their herds around the camps and use the camp markets and water 
supplies. There is also some degree of movement between the Liberated Zone – the easternmost 
quarter or so of Western Sahara, which remains under Polisario/SADR control – and northern 
Mauritania, where another several thousand Sahrawi refugees live. Most Sahrawis live in the 
camps, and not in the Liberated Zone, for two reasons. First, crossing an international border, into 
Algeria, allows the population to be classified as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
whereas those in the Liberated Zone would be internally displaced persons (IDPs). Refugee status 
allows for the provision of UNHCR/WFP humanitarian aid (since UNHCR has a minimal 
mandate for IDPs) and for various other rights and protection services pertaining to refugee status, 
but not directly extensible to IDPs (Porges’ interview with Oxfam representative, Rabouni, 2016). 
Second, the initial camps, near Tifariti in the Liberated Zone, were subjected to napalm attacks 
by Morocco in 1975-1976 (Chamberlain 2005: 24). Placing the camps in Algerian territory makes 
Morocco less likely to attack them in the event of a war, as was the case in 1975-1991, for fear of 
provoking an Algerian response. Algeria’s support for the Sahrawi nationalist project allows the 




Conversely, Polisario/SADR’s presence in Algeria has limited international legal standing, and is 
entirely at the permission of the Algerian government. Polisario/SADR has no legal claim on the 
territory, although in practice, it controls the area around the camps – visitors from Tindouf will 
readily observe the replacement of Algerian military escorts with Polisario soldiers about halfway 
between the airport and Rabouni, the administrative centre of the camps. A government exists in 
the camps, complete with a parliament, local elections, redistribution, and so on (see Wilson 
2016). The state-like functions of Polisario/SADR inside the camps are numerous: ‘From the early 
days of exile, the Frente Polisario organized health, education and food distribution committees 
not merely as a temporary management strategy for the camps, but primarily as a political and 
ideological strategy for progressively establishing the basis of a future Saharawi state’ (San 
Martin 2010: 112). In addition to food and fuel aid, the SADR receives some financial aid directly 
from Algeria, and thus has no need to directly tax its population, although as Wilson (2016) has 
noted, labour policies have some analogies to taxation and redistribution in the camps. Although 
Polisario/SADR claims Laayoune, in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, as its ultimate capital, 
Tifariti, in the Liberated Zone, is used as a temporary one. The main seat of camp governance, 
however, is within the camps, where most Sahrawi officials live. It is here that most diplomatic 
relations – including those with the African Union – are situated. Unlike in the occupied zone, the 
camps are a rich site of international activity (Isidoros 2018: 37-45). There are UNHCR and WFP 
offices, among many other NGOs and charities active in the camps, and MINURSO has a nearby 
site. From the vantage point of the camps, Polisario/SADR is a partially recognised state, and the 
governing structure of a series of refugee camps. 
 
The Liberated Zone 
 
Governance practices in the easternmost region of Western Sahara are somewhat understudied in 
the literature. Most researchers of the Western Sahara conflict give it a brief treatment but rarely 
depart, physically or conceptually, from the refugee camps. The area is remote and less safe than 
the camps, and the Polisario Front/SADR tends to limit access to it for those reasons. It 
nevertheless occupies an important place in the Sahrawi national project, and has been the site of 
a post-war restoration of nomadic activity (Volpato and Howard 2014; Wilson 2017). The 
Western Sahara territory is divided by the Moroccan berm, but the berm is not any sort of 
international border. The Liberated Zone’s legal status is the same as the rest of the former 
Spanish Sahara – part of a non-self-governing territory from the UN’s perspective – but it differs 
from the Moroccan-occupied territory in that its de facto administration is not Moroccan but rather 
Polisario/SADR. 
 
The nomenclature is notable here. Polisario/SADR calls this the Liberated Zone, or ‘free zone’. 
Moroccan literature tends to minimise its size, or deny its existence altogether. MINURSO 
consistently refers to it as ‘east of the berm’ without acknowledging Polisario’s control. There is 
a buffer zone extending five kilometres east of the berm, in which neither Moroccan nor Polisario 
military personnel are permitted. MINURSO records several violations of this restriction every 
year by both sides, perhaps most notably the murder of a Sahrawi nomad by Moroccan soldiers 
in February 2016 (Porges 2017). Sahrawi nomads do routinely enter the buffer zone. Rhetorically, 
Moroccan literature often attempts to elide the buffer zone and the entire Liberated Zone – 
sometimes claiming that Morocco has deliberately left a narrow strip between its area and the 
Algerian border – although this is not the case, and the area is quite large, though its precise size 
is difficult to estimate (Volpato and Howard 2014).  The population size is harder to estimate here 
than in any of the other territorial segments of the conflict. Some estimates place the population 
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around 30,000-40,000 (Sevillano 2010). There are several fairly substantial towns – most notably 
Tifariti – and there are many places in the territory with schools and hospitals. As with the camps, 
population estimates are complicated by a constant nomadic interchange between the camps, the 
Liberated Zone, and northern Mauritania. In fertile years, or at certain times of year, the 
population swells, and at other times it dwindles. The SADR’s Minister of the Liberated Zone 
estimated in an interview that about 8-10% of Sahrawis are permanently nomadic (Porges’ 
interview with SADR’s Minister of the Liberated Zone, Rabouni, 2016). Combining this figure 
with the territory’s sedentary population, Polisario military bases, and Mauritanians entering the 
territory suggests that estimates of 30,000 are not outlandish.  
 
Beyond MINURSO, international presence in the territory is virtually absent. During periods of 
flooding, UNHCR/WFP has occasionally provided limited aid in the Liberated Zone. NGOs and 
charities are also rare or absent. The Mauritanian train from Zouerate to Nouadhibou briefly 
passes through a corner of the Liberated Zone (with the permission of Polisario/SADR) so there 
is at least one international agreement which acknowledges the de facto status of this territory. 
Unlike the occupied zone, the Liberated Zone is unambiguously Polisario-friendly, with 
ubiquitous SADR flags and graffiti, and SADR checkpoints and administrative personnel visible 
in all major towns. The border between the Liberated Zone and Mauritania’s northern province 
of Tiris Zemmour is large and, because of the huge distances and low population density, difficult 
to control. Some degree of informal border-crossing is permitted to nomadic herders seeking 
pasture on either side. The most formalised crossing occurs at the Mauritanian town of Bir 
Moghrein, with most of this cross-border movement facilitating ongoing passage to or from 
Zouerate. Although Sahrawis from the camps are permitted visa-free access to Mauritania, 
Polisario does monitor and control the transport of food aid, fuel, and livestock into Mauritania. 
 
5. Three forms of international (non)recognition 
 
The multiple territorialities of Western Sahara and the SADR are correlated with three distinct 
yet partially overlapping forms of international (non)recognition, which in order of strength are 
the following: the non-recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty claims over the territory of Western 
Sahara, the recognition of the Polisario Front as a national liberation movement and one of the 
two parties to the Western Sahara conflict, and the partial recognition of the SADR as a sovereign 
state. 
 
Firstly, the international non-recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty claims over Western Sahara 
is a direct consequence of the territory’s official UN designation as a non-self-governing territory 
subject to a decolonisation process. Interestingly, Western Sahara is the only territory on the UN 
list of non-self-governing territories for which the ‘administering power’ box is vacant. This 
anomaly results from Spain having officially declared itself ‘exempt from any responsibility of 
any international nature in connection with the administration of the Territory’ since it vacated it 
in early 1976.i The administering power vacuum has stirred up legal controversy between those 
who deem the Spanish relinquishment of responsibility de jure untenable – arguing that the 
Madrid Accords violated article 73 of the UN Charter and failed to be endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly (Soroeta Liceras 2016: 208-209; see Soroeta Liceras 2014) – and proponents of the 
position that, in view of the facts on the ground, ‘Morocco should be classified as the de facto 
administrator of the territory’ (Torres-Spelliscy 2014: 236). In any case, even the latter argument 
refers to a de facto and in theory temporary situation. The bottom line in terms of legal sovereignty 
is that no country in the world has ever taken the step of formally recognising the Moroccan claim 
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to Western Sahara, including the many political supporters and economic partners of Morocco 
which in practice regularly contradict this position through the backdoor. This represents a failure 
of Moroccan foreign policy, whose foremost goal over the last four decades has been to obtain 
formal international recognition, that is legalisation, for the de facto annexation of this territory 
(Fernández-Molina 2016: 46). 
 
A stronger albeit less consensual internationally delegitimising claim is the view that the 
Moroccan (military) presence in Western Sahara constitutes occupation. The UN General 
Assembly described it as such in two resolutions in the early years of the conflict (UN General 
Assembly 1979: paragraph 5; UN General Assembly 1980: paragraph 3). This means that, in 
addition to decolonisation law based on the right to self-determination (articles 73-74 on non-self-
governing territories of the Charter of the UN, plus the two UN human rights covenants of 1966), 
Western Sahara would be subject to international humanitarian law including the law of 
occupation (IV Hague Convention of 1907, IV Geneva Convention of 1949 and 1st Additional 
Protocol), and Morocco should be treated as an occupying state whose ‘hostile army’ exercises 
authority over a territory without title to sovereignty.ii However, although many international 
lawyers support this position arguing that the legal statuses of non-self-governing territory and 
occupied territory are not mutually exclusive (Wrange and Helaoui 2015: 40; see also Soroeta 
Liceras 2016: 231; Saul 2015), the politics of the conflict has made the word ‘occupation’ 
practically disappear from the diplomatic vocabulary of international powers and international 
organisations, including the UN. The exception that confirms the rule was Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon’s one-off reference to Western Sahara’s ‘occupation’ during a visit to the region in 
March 2016 (UN Secretary-General 2016), which led Morocco to accuse the UN of abandoning 
its neutrality and expel dozens of MINURSO staff in retaliation, amid an unprecedented 
diplomatic crisis (Reuters 2016; Porges 2016).  
 
Secondly, the international recognition of the Polisario Front as a national liberation movement 
and conflict party was formally sanctioned by the UN General Assembly, following the lead of 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in two resolutions of 1979 and 1980. The first of them 
described this group as ‘the representative of the people of Western Sahara’ and recommended 
that it ‘participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution of the 
question of Western Sahara’ (UN General Assembly 1979). The second one urged direct 
negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front, ‘representative of the people of Western 
Sahara’ (UN General Assembly 1980). The official two-party structure of the conflict was further 
ratified – and accepted by the parties themselves – with the Settlement Plan resulting from UN 
peacemaking efforts, which both Morocco and the Polisario Front agreed to in 1991 (see UN 
Secretary-General 1990; UN Secretary-General 1991). This act of mutual recognition run 
contrary to the Moroccan long-held position that Western Sahara would actually be a regional 
conflict with Algeria as the kingdom’s real contender – pulling the strings of the Polisario Front 
as a tool for its own pursuit of regional hegemony. The very labelling of the nature and 
geopolitical scale of the Western Sahara conflict has been a continuous bone of contention 
(Fernández-Molina 2017: 13-14). Rabat’s arguments about the regional nature of the conflict and 
the Algerian party-ness resurfaced following King Mohammed VI’s accession to the throne in 
1999 and his gradual disengagement from the Settlement Plan/self-determination referendum 
roadmap. Thereafter, every UN attempt to convene negotiations has been met with Moroccan 
calls to bring Algeria to the negotiation table as a full-blown party (Reuters 2018), thereby 




Thirdly, when it comes to the international recognition of the SADR as a sovereign state, the 
balance sheet is certainly mixed but not close to zero as in the case of Pegg’s de facto states (1998: 
26). While having a weaker international standing than the Polisario Front, the SADR has been 
recognised since its foundation by 84-85 UN member states and continues to maintain diplomatic 
relations with approximately 40 of these. This represents a non-negligible level of ‘titular 
recognition’, which has been defined as ‘the wide formal acceptance (at multilateral level) of an 
entity’s right of or title to statehood (…) as in the cases of Palestine and Western Sahara’ 
(Geldenhuys 2009: 25). Reasons for recognising the SADR have always been primarily normative 
in nature rather than driven by distinct political interests. The first of them lies in the uti possidetis 
principle of international law as applied to African decolonisation, i.e. enshrining the intangibility 
of state borders inherited from colonialism. The second one is based on anticolonialism and the 
view that the Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara constitutes an anomalous continuation of 
European colonial control, and therefore failed decolonisation, of what is often called ‘Africa’s 
last colony’ – an argument that had strong resonance in the Non-Aligned Movement during the 
Cold War. The only purely interest-based motivation for recognising the SADR may have been 
at times the convenience, especially for some African states, of upholding good relations with a 
regional power and rich energy-exporter such as Algeria. More recently, after the turn of the 
millennium, Polisario/SADR have endeavour to bring up to date their classical legal and 
anticolonial arguments by refocusing on the denunciation of Morocco’s human rights violations 
and legally doubtful economic exploitation of the natural resources of the annexed Western 
Sahara territory. This novel ‘low politics’ international strategy (Fernández-Molina 2017: 227-
228), which combines the parliamentary and judicial routes, has succeeded in provoking 
unprecedented diplomatic crises between Morocco on one hand and the UN, the US and the EU 
on the other (Fernández-Molina 2016: 68-72). At any rate, this has had a greater effect in terms 
of upholding the international non-recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty claims over Western 
Sahara than in increasing the international recognition of the SADR as such. 
 
In response, Moroccan foreign policy has tirelessly sought to persuade states in Africa and Latin 
America – the two main historical pools of Sahrawi statehood supporters – to ‘withdraw’ of at 
least ‘freeze’ their recognition of the SADR, even though article 6 of the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention establishes that the recognition of a state is ‘unconditional and irrevocable’.iii 
Moroccan efforts have proven to be successful in around half of the cases.iv Two significant waves 
of recognition withdrawals have taken place in the late 1990s, after the new personal envoy of the 
UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara, James Baker, stepped up efforts to revive the conflict 
resolution process (Smith 2010: 39), and one decade later, following the launch of Morocco’s 
Autonomy Plan for the disputed territory, surrounded by a vast diplomatic and lobbying campaign 
in 2007 (Fernández-Molina 2016: 63-64). At any rate, none of the recognition and recognition 
withdrawal figures invoked by the parties are fully reliable, for they have been continuously 
embroiled in the conflict’s diplomatic and propaganda battles, and in some cases inferred from 
inconsistent political declarations, raising doubts in relation to the ‘question of intent’ which is 
critical to state recognition (Ker-Lindsay 2015: 275-276). 
 
In any case, a clear pattern emerges from the list of past and present recognisers of the SADR, 
namely its distinct non-aligned bias. African members have always stood out as the most 
numerous. At present, they include the continent’s two regional powers, Nigeria and South Africa; 
Algeria, Libya and Mauritania in the Maghreb; as well as about 15 more mainly non-
Francophone, southern and central African countries. Particularly much talked-about and harmful 
to Moroccan interests was South Africa’s recognition of the SADR in 2004, not only for Pretoria’s 
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regional and global influence but also because of the out-of-season timing of the decision, two 
decades after most SADR recognitions. In this late case, the official justification of the decision 
invoked conflict resolution efforts and the need to reenergise the UN-led peace process, supported 
also by the African Union (AU): ‘The two countries reaffirm their commitment towards the 
implementation of the UN/AU Peace Plan for Western Sahara and consider that speedy holding 
of a just, transparent and democratic referendum of self-determination constitutes the only viable 
way which both parties to the conflict agreed to and which received the supports of the entire 
international community’, stated the joint communiqué of the ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
South Africa and the SADR (SPS 2004). In Latin America, the SADR is currently recognised by 
Mexico, Cuba, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, Guyana, Ecuador, 
Bolivia and Uruguay. Beyond Africa and Latin America, the list includes ten countries in various 
parts of Asia (Yemen, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, India, North Korea, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam 
and East Timor) and a handful of Oceanian microstates. The only two European states to have 
recognised the SADR, both in the mid-1980s, are the former Yugoslavia and Albania. In other 
words, no Western state as such has ever taken such step – just like the Soviet Union and its 
Warsaw Pact allies avoided it during the Cold War. The Western European country that has been 
the closest to this is Sweden, where the parliament passed a motion recommending to recognise 
the SADR in 2012, yet the government did not eventually enact it amid Moroccan threats of 
boycotting Swedish companies and products (Stitou 2015). Overall, the mainstream Western 
official position on the conflict is one of twofold non-recognition equally affecting both SADR 
and Moroccan sovereignty claims over Western Sahara.  
 
As regards international organisations, where membership may provide contested states with 
‘indirect collective recognition’ (Ker-Lindsay 2015: 274), the UN has never admitted the SADR 
to membership as a state in keeping with Western Sahara’s official status as a non-self-governing 
territory. The most relevant supporting actor and platform for the SADR has been the AU, along 
with its predecessor the OAU. The OUA’s receptivity was grounded in its foundational normative 
commitment to the eradication of colonialism in Africa and to the uti possidetis principle – two 
norms that favour Sahrawi statehood. The SADR accessed the OAU as a full member in 1982 and 
would act as a founding member of the AU twenty years later. This substantially reinforced its 
titular recognition, or the acknowledgement of its right statehood (Geldenhuys 2014: 361), in 
Africa and beyond – for instance, by enabling it to enter into international legal agreements as an 
AU member. In response, outrage over the SADR’s seating pushed Morocco to withdraw from 
the OAU in 1984 and to remain absent from this and the AU for over three decades, until 2017. 
At the same time, the AU’s indirect collective recognition of the SADR has never been matched 
by an overwhelming intergovernmental consensus among its member states. This is one of the 
many ‘instances of states being admitted into organisations even though some members may not 
recognise them’ (Ker-Lindsay 2015: 274).  
 
In recent years, Moroccan foreign policy has striven to turn such ambiguity in its favour, working 
to persuade AU member states to disengage or rescind recognition from the SADR while paving 
the way for the kingdom’s much-publicised ‘return’ to the pan-African organisation in 2017. In 
this respect, Morocco’s diplomatic success has been only mixed as, in the end, its representatives 
to the AU have begrudgingly accepted to coexist with the Sahrawi ones instead of getting them 
expelled from this forum (Hernando de Larramendi and Tomé-Alonso 2017). Moreover, in legal 
terms, while it would be far-fetched to claim that Morocco’s accession to the AU entails implied 
recognition of the SADR, given the ‘clear intent of non-recognition’ displayed during the process, 
AU membership has created new obligations for the kingdom under the AU Constitutive Act, 
12 
 
which enshrines fundamental principles such as sovereign equality, respect for the borders of AU 
members, peaceful settlement of disputes between members, prohibition of the use of force, and 
so on (Banerjee 2017: 35-36). Aside from the AU, the SADR has remained consistently excluded 
from other relevant regional organisations such as the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union. 
It has only been invited to occasionally participate as a guest in summits of the Non-Aligned 




The SADR shares some common features but remains an outlier within the categories of de facto 
states, quasi-states, unrecognised states and even contested states for three interrelated reasons.  
First, the contestation of its statehood does not originate from secessionism but from foreign 
occupation in the context of a deviant, unfulfilled decolonisation process. Second, its existence is 
less contentious for the international community than that of secessionist contested states because, 
unlike in the latter’s case, its foundation was not in contravention of international law. Third, the 
SADR lacks substantial control over most of the territory it claims, i.e. the non-self-governing 
territory of Western Sahara as defined by the former colonial borders, which is largely occupied 
and annexed by Morocco, while the SADR operates on an essentially extraterritorial basis from 
the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria. The combination of these three circumstances confers the 
SADR a hybrid identity between a state-in-exile and a de facto state, and has the mixed effect of 
reinforcing the SADR’s statehood in constitutive terms (external recognition) while undermining 
it from a declaratory perspective (functional/effectiveness features). The small print of statehood 
and recognition in the case of Western Sahara and the SADR can only be understood in relation 
to their multiple territorialities, including the Western Sahara territory under Moroccan 
occupation, the Algerian headquarters and primary area of governance of the SADR, and the 
Liberated Zone controlled by the Polisario Front/SADR in Western Sahara proper. These 
territorialities are correlated with three partially overlapping sources of international 
(non)recognition, i.e. the non-recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty claims over the territory of 
Western Sahara, the recognition of the Polisario Front as a national liberation movement and a 
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